

Migration of Eretz Yisrael Arabs between December 1, 1947 and June 1, 1948

Contents

1. General introduction.
2. Basic figures on Arab migration
3. National phases of evacuation and migration
4. Causes of Arab migration
5. Arab migration trajectories and absorption issues

Annexes

1. Regional reviews analyzing migration issues in each area [Missing from document]
2. Charts of villages evacuated by area, noting the causes for migration and migration trajectories for every village

1. General introduction

The purpose of this overview is to attempt to evaluate the intensity of the migration and its various development phases, elucidate the different factors that impacted population movement directly and assess the main migration trajectories. Of course, given the nature of statistical figures in Eretz Yisrael in general, which are, in themselves, deficient, it would be difficult to determine with certainty absolute numbers regarding the migration movement, but it appears that the figures provided herein, even if not certain, are close to the truth. Hence, a margin of error of ten to fifteen percent needs to be taken into account. The figures on the population in the area that lies outside the State of Israel are less accurate, and the margin of error is greater. This review summarizes the situation up until June 1st, 1948 (only in one case – the evacuation of Jenin, does it include a later occurrence).

2. Basic figures on Arab population movement in Eretz Yisrael

a. At the time of the UN declaration [*resolution*] regarding the division of Eretz Yisrael, the following figures applied within the borders of the Hebrew state:

1. 219 Arab villages.
 2. 4 Cities with Arab populations as well (Haifa, Tiberias, Safed, Beit Shean)
 3. The Arab rural population in the State of Israel was 190,000.
 4. The Arab urban population in the State of Israel was 92,000.
 5. The Bedouin population in the State of Israel, in the Negev was 60,000 (estimate)
-
- 342,000.

b. The rate of migration from the State of Israel until June 1, 1948 (including Jenin and the south, until June 14, 1948):

1. Approximately 180 Arab villages empty.	
2. 3 cities entirely empty, and in Haifa, only 5,000 residents.	
3. Of the total rural Arab population in the country, the number of people who migrated:	152,000
4. Of the total urban Arab population in the country, the number of people who migrated:	87,000
5. Negev Bedouin did not migrate at all from the country	
6. Total who left the State of Israel	<u>239,000</u>

In percentages:

1. 82% of the total number of Arab rural locales in the country were abandoned.
2. 80% of the total rural Arab population in the country left.
3. 94% of the total urban Arab population in the country left.
4. 0% of the total Negev Bedouin migrated.

c. The rate of migration in the territory of the Arab state + Jerusalem.

1. At least 70 Arab villages were evacuated in the Arab state.
2. 3 Arab cities were evacuated – one completely (Jenin), and 2 of the majority of residents. (4,000 persons were left in Acre, and 4,600 in Jaffa).
3. Two other Arab cities were partly evacuated (Lod, Ramla).
4. 50,000 villagers from the Arab state left and migrated.
5. 72,000 urban dwellers from the Arab state left and migrated.
6. The total number of Arabs who migrated from the Arab state: 122,000.
7. 30,000 Arabs migrated from Jerusalem.
8. In total, 152,000 Eretz Yisrael Arabs migrated from their places of residence outside the State of Israel.

d. The number of Arabs who remained in the State of Israel:

1. No. of urban dwellers who remained in the State of Israel	5,000
2. No. of villagers who remained in the State of Israel	38,000
3. No. of Bedouins (in the Negev) who remained in the State of Israel	<u>60,000</u>
	103,000
4. 39 inhabited Arab villages remained in the country (With respect to some, there is no information that they left).	
5. Only one of the cities of the State of Israel has an Arab population (Haifa: 5,000 persons).	

e. The rate of migratory movement in Eretz Yisrael as a whole:

The number of displaced Arabs is 391,000.

(As stated in the introduction, the margin of error is 10%-15%).

Comments:

1. For more details regarding these figures and a breakdown by area - see the table below.
2. For a list of villages, towns, reasons for evacuation, trajectories, etc., see enclosed annexes.

3. Phases in the Arab migration

The six-month Arab migration (December 1947 to May and beyond) has four distinct phases:

First phase : Begins in early December and lasts until late February.

Second phase : The month of March.

Third phase : The month of April.

Fourth phase : The month of May.

The phases in detail:

First phase: The main feature of this stage is that, at this time, the migration movement is only beginning. It occurs in few places. In all fronts throughout the country, movement is extremely small. Only in the Central Region, movement takes place at the end of this phase, that is, mostly in February, when movement there begins and its intensity, per se, is medium.

Second phase: At this stage, a small amount of movement is felt in most fronts, and in fact, there is a slight reduction compared to the first phase. In some fronts, it seems that migration is waning. This is particularly true with respect to the Central Region, where activity was felt during the first phase. However, where the national trend is a decline, the Jaffa front, as well as the Sea of Galilee area, exhibit an increase with a stronger intensity than the intensity of evacuation in the first phase.

Third phase: This phase is marked by a moderate increase in almost most fronts, moderate increase in the Sea of Galilee area with the evacuation of Tiberias. Moderate increase in the Haifa area with the evacuation of Haifa. Moderate increase in the Tel-Hai district with increased activities on our part. No change in the state of migration in the Negev, which had yet to begin evacuation. Balanced situation in terms of the evacuation of Jaffa – i.e. slight increase from the previous phase and as a continuation thereof. Decrease in migration movement in the Gilboa area. However, a major increase in the Central Region, which peaks in this month, both on the national level and in terms of movement in the region itself. In conclusion: the third phase shows a moderate general increase with one peak point and one downward trend.

The fourth phase: This stage spans the month of May. It is the principal and decisive phase of the Arab migration in Eretz Yisrael. A migration psychosis begins to emerge, a crisis of confidence with respect to Arab strength. As a result, migration in this sage is characterized by:

Major increase in migration trajectory in	Tel-Hai	district.
“ “ “ “ “ “	Gilboa	“ .
“ “ “ “ “ “	Jaffa	“ .
“ “ “ “ “ “	Western Galilee	“ .

Evacuation in Negev villages takes place in this month. On the other hand, the Central Region enters this phase having peaked already, with most villages having been evacuated. Therefore, for the Central Region, this phase is the “final stretch”. Because the number of remaining villages in the Central Region was small, the seemingly significant decrease felt here is no more than the final touch. The only place where a true decrease is felt in this month is the Sea of Galilee area.

Conclusion: The mass migration of Eretz Yisrael Arabs took place in April-May. May was a climax and recorded as the month during which most of the Arab migration took place, or, more precisely, the Arab flight.

4. Causes of Arab migration

a. General

It is reasonable to assume that this migration was not financially motivated – be it a shortage of employment, food or any other financial distress. So long as residents remained where they were, the Arab economy was not harmed in such a way that broke the population's ability to support itself. The financial factor was a motivator in migration only during the very initial phases of the migration movement, when the wealthy among the Arabs, wishing to secure their property and factories, were quick to emigrate. A fluctuation in Arab economic stability was felt in the cities, a fluctuation that was a migration catalyst for some social strata, but this fluctuation – such as the migration of the wealthy, is not a major factor when discussing the mass migration of Eretz Yisrael Arabs.

It is also reasonable to assume that the population movement was not the result of “purely” political factors, meaning: political decisions, in the narrow sense of the word, had no effect whatsoever on the migration movement. Although the massive Arab migration proliferated particularly in the month of May, this should not be taken to be the result of the political significance of that month. Here, it should be noted, that inasmuch as there were locales where the political factor was a motivator for migration movement, this was confined to the cities, and there too, in very limited strata and on a minute scale. These numbers are so small, compared to the general wave of migration and its intensity, that it can be assumed, with certainty, that political factors had no effect whatsoever on the movement of the Arab population.

In reviewing the factors that affected migration, we list the factors that had a definitive effect on population migration. Other factors, localized and smaller scale, are listed in the special reviews of migration movement in each district. The factors, in order of importance, are:

1. Direct Jewish hostile actions against Arab communities.
2. Impact of our hostile actions against communities neighboring where migrants lived (here – particularly – the fall of large neighboring communities).
3. Actions taken by the Dissidents [Irgun, Lehi].
4. Orders and directives issued by Arab institutions and gangs.
5. Jewish Whispering operations [psychological warfare] intended to drive Arabs to flee.
6. Evacuation ultimatums.
7. Fear of Jewish retaliation upon a major Arab attack on Jews.
8. The appearance of gangs and foreign fighters near the village.
9. Fear of an Arab invasion and its consequences (mostly near the borders).
10. Arab villages isolated within purely Jewish areas.
11. Various local factors and general fear of what was to come.

b. The factors in detail.

Without a doubt, hostilities were the main factor in the population movement. Each and every district underwent a wave of migration as our actions in that area intensified and expanded. In general, for us, the month of May signified a transition into wide-scale operations, which is why the month of May involved the evacuation of the maximum number of locales. The departure of the English, which was merely the other side of the coin, did, of course, help evacuation, but it appears that more than affecting migration directly, the British evacuation freed our hands to take action.

Note that it was not always the intensity of the attack that was decisive, as other factors became particularly prominent – mostly psychological factors. The element of surprise, long stints of shelling with extremely loud blasts, and loudspeakers in Arabic proved very effective when properly used (mostly Haifa!);

It has, however, been proven, that actions had no lesser effect on neighboring communities as they did on the community that was the direct target of the action. The evacuation of a certain village as a result of us attacking it swept with it many neighboring villages.

The impact of the fall of large villages, centers, towns or forts with a large concentration of communities around them is particularly apparent. The fall of Tiberias, Safed, Samakh, Jaffa, Haifa and Acre produced many large migration waves. The psychological motivation at work here was “If the mighty have fallen....”. In conclusion, it can be said that at least 55% of the overall migration movement was motivated by our actions and their impact.

The actions of the Dissidents and their impact as migration motivators: The actions of the Dissidents as migration motivators were particularly apparent in the Jaffa Tel-Aviv area; the Central Region, the south and the Jerusalem area. In other places, they did not have any direct impact on evacuation. Dissidents’ actions with special impact: Deir Yassin, the kidnapping off five dignitaries from Sheikh Muwannis, other actions in the south. The Deir Yassin action had a particular impact on the Arab psyche. Much of the immediate fleeing seen when we launched our attacks, especially in the center and south, was panic flight resulting from that factor, which can be defined as a decisive catalyst. There was also panic flight spurred by actions taken by the Irgun and Lehi themselves. Many Central Region villagers went into flight once the dignitaries from Sheikh Muwannis were kidnapped. The Arab learned that it was not enough to make a deal with the Haganah, and there were “other Jews”, of whom one must be wary, perhaps even more wary than of members of the Haganah, which had no control over them.

The Dissidents’ effect on the evacuation of Jaffa city and the Jaffa rural area is clear and definitive – decisive and critical impact among migration factors here. If we were to assess the contribution made by the Dissidents as factors in the evacuation of Arabs in Eretz Yisrael we would find that they had about 15% direct impact on the total intensity of the migration.

To summarize the previous sections, one could, therefore, say that the impact of “Jewish military action” (Haganah and Dissidents) on the migration was decisive, as some 70% of the residents left their communities and migrated as a result of these actions.

Orders and directives issued by Arab institutions and gangs: This evacuation, which may be termed “orderly evacuation” was carried out for strategic reasons, at the demand of the gangs, the Arab Higher Committee or the Transjordan government – whether as a result of a plan to turn the village into a base from which to launch attacks on Jews, an understanding that the village could not be defended, or fear that it would become a fifth column, especially if it had made an agreement with the Jews. The impact of this factor was mainly felt in the Gilboa area (threats to the Zu’biya), the Sea of Galilee area

(Circassian villages), the Tel-Hai area (border villages), the center (isolated cases) and the Jerusalem area (Legion orders to evacuate a string of villages to serve as bases in northern Jerusalem, and the order issued by the Arab Higher Committee to the village of Esawiyah). However, compared to other factors, this element did not have decisive weight, and its impact amounts to some 5% of all villages having been evacuated for this reason.

Jewish psychological warfare to make Arab residents flee. This type of action, when considered as part of the national phenomena, was not a factor with a broad impact. However, 18% of all the villages in the Tel-Hai area, 6% of the village in the central region, and 4% of the Gilboa region villages were evacuated for this reason.

Where in the center and the Gilboa regions such actions were not planned or carried out on a wide scale, and therefore had a smaller impact, in the Tel-Hai district, this type of action was planned and carried out on a rather wide scale and in an organized fashion, and therefore yielded greater results. The action itself took the form of “friendly advice” offered by Jews to their neighboring Arab friends. This type of action drove no more than 2% of the total national migration.

Our ultimatums to Arab villages: This factor was particularly felt in the center, less so in the Gilboa area and to some extent in the Negev. Of course, these ultimatums, like the friendly advice, came after the stage had been set to some extent by hostilities in the area. Therefore, these ultimatums were more of a final push than the decisive factor. Two percent of all evacuated village locales in the country were evacuated due to ultimatums.

Fear of reprisals. This evacuation, which can also be termed “organized evacuation” came mostly after actions against Jews had been launched from inside the village or its vicinity. An Arab attack on a Jewish convoy (the “Ehud” convoy on route to Ahiam, for instance), or a Jewish Arab battle (the Mishmar HaEmek front, the Geshar front, the attack on Lehavot, etc.), automatically impacted the evacuation of nearby villages. One percent of evacuated Arab locales left due to this factor.

All other factors listed as the appearance of gangs and foreign fighters in the vicinity of a village, fear of the consequences of an Arab invasion that could turn the village into a battlefield, especially on the borders of the country, and the fact that certain villages were isolated inside purely Jewish areas, were also motivators for evacuation, depending on the locale. In some areas they had a greater impact than in others, just as in other areas, they had almost no impact at all. All these factors together account for no more than 1%.

General fear. Although this factor is listed last, it did have a sizeable impact and played a significant part in the evacuation. Still, given its generality, we chose to conclude with it. When the war began, various reasons caused general fear within the strata of the Arab public, which chose to emigrate for no apparent, particular, reason. However, this general fear was the primary manifestation of the “crisis of confidence” in Arab strength.

It is reasonable to assume that 10% of all villages evacuated for this reason, such that, in effect, the impact of the “crisis of confidence” was the third most important factor following our actions and the actions of the Dissidents and their impact. Local factors also had a rather marked impact on migration movement: failed negotiations, plans to impose restricted settlement, inability to adjust to certain realities, failed negotiations for maintaining the status-quo or non-aggression agreements – all had an effect in certain areas (for instance, the south), but fail to have any presence in other areas. It can be said that 8%-9% of the evacuated villages in the country were evacuated because of various local factors. These factors are listed by locales in the regional reviews attached herein.

General comments:

1. Evacuation psychosis:

The pace of evacuation often increased as a result of the emergence of an evacuation psychosis that surfaced like an infectious disease. So, for instance, it is reasonable to assume that, in Acre, the mass arrival of Haifa refugees who instilled the evacuation psychosis in Acre residents had a decisive impact. Given minor attacks and a push by various catalysing factors, a mass immigration movement from Acre has also started, with this psychosis having its fair share in it. In considering the factors for evacuation, it appears that this “unseen” factor cannot be disregarded.

2. The Typhus plague, where it appeared, was a catalyst in the evacuation – more than the disease itself, the panic that erupted due to rumors about the spread of the disease in the area, was the evacuation motivator.
3. The impact of extremely loud explosives, loudspeakers, etc., as psychological intimidation actions had on the migration movement must be highlighted (incidentally, no attempt was made to attach loud sirens to the wings of aircrafts that were bombing enemy posts – so these might have a great impact).
4. In places where a serious Arab fighting force was present, the village did not evacuate easily, and only a direct, serious action, took down this force and led to an evacuation.
5. In the early stages of the evacuation, when the scope was still small, Arab institutions tried to counter flight the evacuation and restrain the migration waves. The Arab Higher Committee decided, at the time, to take measures to depress flight by imposing restrictions and penalties, using threats and propaganda in the press, on the radio, etc. On this issue the Arab Higher Committee tried to enlist the help of neighboring countries, which often shared the same interests on this point. They mostly tried to prevent the flight of young men of conscription age. However, none of these actions were at all successful as no positive action was taken that could have restrained the factors that motivated and pushed the migration. The actions taken by the preventative mechanism simply led to corruption, and permits were issued in return for bribes. When the mass flight took place, this mechanism also collapsed, leaving only sporadic propaganda which yielded no real results.

5. Arab migration trajectories

a. General

One of the central questions in the discussion of Arab migration in Eretz Yisrael is the new centers where they are concentrated. On this issue, villagers and urban migrants are two different discussions. As a rule, it can be said that the origin of a group largely determined the migration destination. Most residents of Haifa originate from Lebanon and Syria, and so, the migration trajectory of most Haifa residents was toward Lebanon and Syria. Similarly, the people of Faluja, in Jaffa, returned to their village. However, it should be noted that most of the wealthy urban dwellers and people of means in the cities emigrated abroad.

Urban Arab dwellers markedly showed a more decisive migration trend. The road to the urban dweller’s “final destination” was much shorter than that of the villager. While the urban dweller did not move around between stops along the way, the villager often had to move from one place to another multiple times. This affair, of the villager’s wanderings, stems from several reasons, but mostly, the family origin of villagers determined the migration routes taken by those fleeing. For

instance, in the first phase of the evacuation and flight, migrants tended to move from the plains to the mountains, or from the south to the coastal region.

Another factor that impacted migration trajectories in rural areas in the early stages was villagers fleeing to the nearest, largest Arab urban center – even if they had no family connections, work connections or acquaintances there. Here, security was the decisive factor. This factor was largely integrated with previous factors, and in other cases, in the absence of other factors, it was the decisive one. For these reasons, a villager had to divide his migration trail, unbeknownst to him, to multiple phases, multiple stops – as indeed, these factors did not always take him to a safe area.

A review of the migration trajectories of villagers reveals multiple stops, a much less apparent trend in the migration of city dwellers. So, for instance, some residents of the village of Beit Susin in the south, migrated to al-Mughar and from there to Yavneh, from Yavneh to Ashdod and from Ashdod to Gaza. For this reason, villages that served as destination points in the first phase of the flight, turned into points of escape in the second phase, and so forth. Many migrated to Beit Shean from neighboring villages, and had to flee from there when residents of Beit Shean themselves fled.

It is also important to note that given that villagers' migration routes were initially rather short (in terms of how far they got from the village), and given that a village was evacuated without our stationing a unit there permanently, there was also a movement of return to villages that had been evacuated, which forced us to engage, on more than one occasion, in expelling residents of a certain village.

There are no “national centers” of migration absorption to speak of, not only because no one organized the migration movement and took care to direct it in certain trajectories, but also because of the trajectories the Arab migration movement took. True, we ultimately do find centers where many Arab migrants remain, many who came from different parts of the country. This is the outcome of a long trail with many stops along the way, which was random, created solely by the security criterion. In this respect, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt and Transjordan abroad, the Arab Triangle, the Ramallah and Birzeit area and the southern coastal plain of Eretz Yisrael do form the main centers that absorbed Arab migration in Eretz Yisrael. However, this should not be taken as an indication on the national level.

One of the main questions, which we cannot answer, is: How many migrated abroad and how many to centers inside Eretz Yisrael? On this issue, we can only make several assumptions:

1. The wealthy among city dwellers migrated primarily to Arab countries.
2. Many villagers, including those lacking means, who came mostly from border areas, migrated to Syria and Lebanon.
3. The main migration to Egypt came from Jaffa, the south, Haifa and Jerusalem.
4. The main migration to Transjordan came from the Sea of Galilee communities, the Yizrael district, the Gilboa district, Acre, Jaffa and Jerusalem.
5. It appears that Syria and Lebanon received most of those who migrated abroad, followed by Transjordan, and lastly, Egypt.

b. Population absorption centers

The following is a list of the centers where those fleeing migrated. The list is divided by the different parts of the country, and the centers for each district or area are listed in order of importance.

1. Tel-Hai district
 - Syria,
 - Lebanon,
 - Darabshiyah
 - Hula marshes
 - Golan
 - Sa'sa'
 - Qaddita
2. Sea of Galilee
 - Transjordan
 - Syria
 - Lebanon
 - Nazareth and its vicinity
 - Lubya
 - Mughar
 - Boutaiha
 - Haifa
 - Samakh (until it fell)
 - Safed (until it fell)
3. Yizrael district
 - "Triangle" villages
 - Karmel villages
 - Safuriya
 - Ilut
 - Tur'an
 - Abu Shusha
 - Nazareth
 - Transjordan
4. Gilboa
 - Transjordan
 - Nazareth and vicinity
 - Arab triangle
 - Gilboa Mountain
 - Beit Shean (until it fell)
5. Haifa city limits
 - Syria
 - Lebanon
 - Lebanese border area
- Triangle (until it fell)
- Nazareth and Shfaram
- Few to Egypt
- Few to Cyprus
6. Acre city limits
 - Lebanon
 - Border villages
 - Transjordan
 - Few to Cyprus
7. Haifa-Western Galilee District
 1. Northern border villages (Yarka, Tarshiha)
 - Lebanon
 - Triangle
 - Ghabisiyya
 - Sa'sa'
 - Ijzim
 - Dalia
 - Ein Hawd
 - Umm a-Zinat
8. Central Region
 - Nablus
 - Tulkarem
 - Rummanah
 - Umm al-Fahm
 - Barta'ah
 - Baqah al-Gharbiyah
 - Jat
 - Kufrein
 - Taybeh
 - Qalansuwa
 - Qalqiliyah
 - Kafr Qasem
 - Majdal
 - Tantura
 - Ijzim
 - Beit Lid
 - Ramla
 - Lod
 - a-Sindiyyana
 - Haifa (until it fell)

9. Jaffa city limits

Ramla
Lod
Gaza
Khan Yunis
South – coastal plane
Egypt
Amman (a few)
Syria, Lebanon (a few)

10. Jaffa villages

South
Triangle
Ramla
Lod

11. South

Gaza and coastal plane area
Ramla
Lod
Hamama (a few)
Masmiyya (a few)
Beersheva (a very small number)

12. Negev

Gaza
Khan Yunis)
Majdal)
Beit Lahyia) coastal areas
Nazla) outside the country.
Khreibeh)
Damra)

13. Jerusalem

Hebron
Bethlehem
Beit Jala
Ramallah
Birzeit
Transjordan
Gaza and Egypt
Syria (the wealthy)
Lebanon (the wealthy)
Egypt (the wealthy)

c. Issues with absorption

The absorption of Arabs of means was not a problem per se, since they provided for themselves and handled, some more, some less, the new cost of living. However, since most of the migrants were not of this social stratum, not to mention that many left without any possessions, once the waves of migration began to arrive, serious issues with absorption emerged. The problems grew worse as time went by. This was expressed in the persistence of calls from Arab countries for refugees to return to their homes, and artificial pressure on young men of conscription age to return to the front. The sheer number of announcements issued by Syria and Lebanon indicate that the refugees were beginning to become a serious burden, and that they were clearly making their mark on the economy of neighboring countries and society there – especially in Syria and Lebanon. It is no coincidence that Azzam Faha declared that the number of Eretz Yisrael refugees in foreign countries is up to 250,000 (the number may be a slight exaggeration, but it is close to reality). In addition, it is no coincidence that the Transjordan radio – Radio Jerusalem – began broadcasting announcements, a series of “educational lectures” for the people of Eretz Yisrael urging them to return to their country and help “the war effort”, providing “definitive proof” that those who returned were not risking their lives, especially considering the fact that “all over the world, only 10% fight and the rest serve in the rear”, and especially “when the Arabs are on the brink of certain victory”. The announcements made by King Abdullah regarding the refugees etc., are also characteristic. These announcements and

declarations simply prove that as early as in the first weeks following the peak in migration, late May and early June, the refugee problem in neighboring countries was beginning to be bothersome in different ways that we address below. The issue was especially irksome due to the particularly large number of people lacking means among the migrants.

One of the important questions related to the problem of Arab migration was whether the Arab migrant would become a fighter or not. The Arab fighter has not turned into a fighter. His sole focus now is collecting handout money. He has accepted the lowest standard of living, choosing it over joining the war. There are many factors at play here, but two are central: First, the assessment of Jewish strength and the crisis of confidence in Arab strength. Second, the war in Eretz Yisrael developed in such a way that there was no room for "volunteers" to fight, not to mention that the main volunteer force, the "Liberation Army", fell apart at the time. The refugee problem troubling Arab countries has a significant impact on society and on the economy and brings with it problems which will grow worse, particularly given that no serious, comprehensive and organized measures are taken by Arab countries to resolve the issue.

Annex No. 1

Evacuated Arab villages by district:

a. Tel-Hai district

Total residents	23,790
Migrated	<u>20,620</u>
Remained	3,170

Village populations during normal times

Madahil)		Kirad al-Ghanname	350	
Arab al-'Azazyat)	410	Kirad al-Baqqara	360	
Khisas		530	Deishum	590	
Zuq a-Tahtani)		Malikiyya	360	
Zuq al-Fawqani)	1050	Nabi Yusha'	70	
Shawka		200	Qadas	320	
Abil al-Qamh		330	'Alma	950	
Hunin		1620	Saliha	1130	
Khalisa		1840	Rihaniyya	290	
Na'ima		1310	Ras al-Ahmar	660	
Lazzaza		230	Dallata	360	
Qaitiyya		940	Qaddita	240	
Manshiyya (included with Zuq a-Tahtani			Ammuqa a-Tahta)	
Mansura		360	Ammuqa a-Fuqa)	140
'Abisiyya		830	Ein Zaitun		620
Dawwara		700	Biriyya		240
Hamra			Mirun		290
Muftakhira		350	Mughr al-Kheit		490
Salihyya		1520	Mansurat al-Kheit		900
Zawiya		760	Arab al-Heib		
Jahula		420	Ja'una		1150
Buwaiziyya		510	Zhahiriyya		350
Khiyam al-Walid		210	Akbara		410
Dirbashiyya		310	Safed		5770
Ghuraba		220	Sammu'i		310
Arab a-Zubeid)		Fir'im		740
Mallaha)	890	Qabba'a		460
Baisamun		20	Marus		80
'Ulmaniyya		260	Arab al-Zanghariyya		840

Degree of Evacuation

Date	Village	Full/Partial	Evacuation cause	Evacuation trajectory, comments
18.1	Mughr al-Kheit	F	Our reprisal	To Syria, after stealing our sheep herd
"	Mansurat al-Kheit	"	" "	To Syria
12.2	Shawka	"	" "	To Shawka Fuqa, returned shortly after.
26.3	Khisas	P		
29.3	Khiyam al-Walid	F	Participated in attack on Lehavot	To Syria. Some returned later.
7.4	Madahil			To the Golan
20.4	Arab a-Zubeid	F	General departure of Mughrabis	To Lebanon
20.4	'Ulmaniya	F	Our action	Many killed
21.4	Huseiniyya	F	Effect of our action in 'Ulmaniya	
22.4	Kirad al-Baqqara	F	Effect of our action " and fear of invasion.	To Syria. Some joined the Syrian army
22.4	Kirad al-Ghanname	F	Effect of action and fear of invasion	To Syria. Some joined the Syrian army
30.4	Madahil	F	Prior to attack on Kfar Szold	To the Golan. Knew about the attack and fled beforehand.
1.5	Arab al-'Azaziyat	F	Attack on Kfar Szold	To Banyas. Joined gangs.
1.5	Khiyam al-Walid	F	" "	To Seida-Syria. Fled completely after returning earlier.
1.5	Hamra	F	Attack on Lehavot, our harassment	To Syria and Dirbashiyya. Participated in attack on Lehavot.
1.5	Ghuraba	P	Attack on Lehavot, our harassment	To Syria and Dirbashiyya. Participated in attack on Lehavot.
1.5	Muftakhira	P	Attack on Lehavot	In Dirbashiyya. Returned later.
2.5	Ein Zaitun	F	Destruction of village by us	Many killed
2.5	Biriyya	F	" "	" "
2.5	Qaitiyya	P	Harassment, threat of attack and convoy passage	Returned later
3.5	Hunin	F	Fear of our attacks	In Lebanon
4.5	Arab a-Zanghariyya	F	Searches by us	Syria (?)
4.5	Arab al-Qudeiriyya	F	" " "	"
4.5	Arab as-Samakiya	F	" " "	"
9.5	Ja'una	F	As Safed faltered	Ras al-Ahmar. Our actions in Safed had an effect.
9.5	Deishum	F	Concentration of gangs our them and our actions	To Lebanon
10.5	Safed	F	Occupied	Beirut, Damascus, Huran. Critical impact on the vicinity.
10.5	Akbara	F	Many killed	
10.5	Zhahiriyya	F	Safed impact (?)	
10.5	Abil al-Qamh	F	Fear of invasion, fall of Safed.	To Lebanon. Some fled in the beginning of the incidents.
11.5	Qaddita	F	Fall of Safed impact	Sa'sa' – outside borders of State of Israel.

11.5	Zuq a-Tahtani	F	“ “ “ “	To Lebanon
11.5	Khalisa	F	Asked for agreement with fall of Safed. Refused. Fled.	To 'Udayisa, Lebanon. There had been an agreement with them previously. Kept well.
11.5	Buwaiziyya	F	Fled with the evacuation of Khalisa	To Lebanon. Afraid because they were on our traffic line.
12.5	Sammu'i	F	Fall of Safed	
14.5	Na'ima	F	“ “	To Syria. Entered negotiations beforehand, but fall of Safed determined.
14.5	Shawka	F	“ “ fear of invasion	To Syria
16.5	Muftakhira	F	[page 3 of Annex No. 1] The Sheikh was afraid and left with everyone	This is the final flight, after they returned once.
16.5	Nabi Yusha'	F	Our attack on Police station	
19.5	Qaitiyya	F	Threats and our whispering operations by us	Final exit, since some returned.
21.5	Zuq al-Fawqani	F	Our Whispering operation and mortars	Effect of mortars strong.
21.5	Lazzaza	F	Our Whispering operation	To Syria
24.5	Manshiyya	F	Our Whispering operation	To Lebanon.
24.5	Zawiya	F	Our attack	Some to Hula marshes, some to Syria.
24.5	Ammuqa a-Tahta	F	Our action	To Lebanon
24.5	Ammuqa a-Fuqa	F	“ “	“ “
25.5	Khisas	F	Whispering operation and Safed effect	To Syria
25.5	Saliha	F	Our warnings and Whispering operation	Some to the marshes and some to Syria
25.5	Mansura	F	Our Whispering operation	To Syria
25.5	Baisamun	F	“ “	“
25.5	'Abbasiyya	F	Flight from Mansura impacted	To Syria
25.5	Dawwara	F	Whispering operation	To Dirbashiyya
25.5	Salihyya	F	Wanted to negotiate. We did not turn up. Afraid	Friendly village, fear because we did not turn up to negotiate.
26.5	Fir'im	F	Our attack on them	To Lebanon
26.5	Qabba'a	F	Our attack on them	“
26.5	Marus	F	Our attack on them and in the area	“ (?)
28.5	Malikiyya	F	Our occupation	To Lebanon. Wanted to return and tried to negotiate

28.5	Qadas	F	Effect of occupation of Malikiyya	To Lebanon
28.5	Ghuraba	F	Final evacuation	

b. Sea of Galilee District

<u>Village populations during normal times</u>			
Maghar	2,140	al-Hamah	290
Yaquq	210	Hadatha	550
as-Samakiya	380	Tiberias	5,770
a-Tabigha	330	Adamiyya	
Ghuweir Abu		Sirin	
Shusha	1,240	Ma'dhar	510
Eilabun	550	Samakh	3,660
Majdal	240	Arab a-Zubayd	
Arab al-Mawasi	1,870	Khirbat al-Qadish	410
Bu'eineh	540		
Nimrin	320		
Hittin	1,190		
Lubya	2,350		
Shajara	770		
al-Manara	490		
Arab Nasir a-Din	90		
Kafr Sabt	480		
Samra & Nuqeib	290		
Kafr Kama	660		
'Ubeidiyya	920		
'Ulam	720		

[page 4 of Annex No. 1]

Degree of Evacuation

Date	Village	Full/Partial	Evacuation cause	Evacuation trajectory, comments
22.12	Tiberias	-	Fear	From outlining area into central areas
1.2.48	Samakh	P	Tension, as located on crossroads	Mostly the wealthy, women and children are evacuated. 50% had left before the complete evacuation.
5.3	'Ubeidiyya	F	Fear as a result of being surrounded by Jews	To the area of Nazareth
15.3	Adamiyya	F	Transjordan government orders	Since they are Persian, many to Persia and the rest to Transjordan
6.4	Sirin	F	Transjordan government orders	Area of Nazareth and Transjordan
6.4	'Ulam	F	" "	" "
6.4	Hadatha	F	" "	" "
6.4	Ma'dhar	F	" "	" "
15.4	Samakh	F	Fear when they heard about the action in Tiberias	To border villages in Transjordan. Bedouins.
18.4	Tiberias	F	Our action. Lack of local leaders. The	Nazareth, Lubya, Hammah – Syria, Transjordan, Lebanon

			wealthy fled earlier.	
19.4	Arab al-Zubayd	F	Tiberias effect.	To Ein Mahil. Sometimes come down to work fields
21.4	Samra & Nuqeib	F	Tiberias effect	To Syrian mountains. The village are tenant farmers. Syrian origin
21.4	Khirbat al-Qadish		“ “	To Lubya and Samakh
21.4	Ghuweir Abu Shusha	P	“ “	
21.4	Arab Shajara	P	“ “	Nazareth
21.4	Samakh	P	Our attack on Samakh	To Transjordan. The foreigners did not let everyone leave.
22.4	Majdal	F	Out attack. Tiberias and Samakh effect	To Transjordan. Transported in buses.
22.4	Kafr Sabt	F	Tiberias and Samakh effect	
23.4	Nasir a-Din	F	Appearance of gang	Lubya and vicinity
28.4	Samakh	F	Occupation of police	To Hamah Transjordan
“	Ghuwier	F	Fall of Tiberias had very strong impact	
28.4	Abu Shusha	F	Fall of Samakh	To the mountains in the area
1.5	a-Tabigha	F	Samakh effect	To Syria and Safed
6.5	Arab Shajara	F	Our attack	To the Nazareth area.

c. Gilboa District

<u>Village populations during normal times</u>			
Qumya	450	Na'ura	250
Sulam	500	Kafra	700
Dahi	120	Yubla	150
Nein	200	Murassas	600
Indur	600	Danna	400
Tamra	70	Bira	500
Kafr Misr	400	Kawkab al-Hawa	600
Tira Harb	200	Arab al-Bashatiwa	1,000
Taiyiba	450		
[page 5 of Annex No. 1]			
Arab al-Bawati)	Samiriyya	500
Kafr Bawati) 700	Jabbul	250
Hamidiyya	300	Zir'in	1300 (out of the country)
Beit Shean	5000	Nuris	700
Arab az-Zinati	500	Mazar	350
Arab 'Arida)	Sandala	350
Arab Safa) 600	Tall a-Shawk	120
Arab al-Khuneizir	400	Arab	
Farwana	350	a-Sakhina	200

Degree of Evacuation

Date	Village	Full/Partial	Evacuation cause	Evacuation trajectory, comments
30.3	Qumya	F	Isolation among Jews, lack of transportation and work	To Beit Shean, Nazareth and Transjordan
30.3	Bawati	F	Light reprisal action	To Transjordan. Bedouin
15.4	Tira	F	Friendly Jewish advice	
1.5	Beit Shean	P	Fear and Haifa effect	To the Triangle and Transjordan
1.5	Jabbul	P	Fear	
1.5	Hamidiyya	P	Fear, proximity to Jews	
1.5	Zir'in	P	Our attacks are a factor	
11.5	Farwana	F	Our action	To the Triangle
12.5	Beit Shean	F	Occupation. Fear. Haifa effect	Evacuation lasted until 22.5
12.5	Hamidiyya	F	Fall of Beit Shean	To Transjordan, to the Triangle (Arraba)
12.5	Samiriyya	P	Farwana impact	To the Triangle
16.5	Kawkab al-Hawa	F	Occupation of the village by us	To Transjordan
16.5	Kafra	F	Occupation of Kawkab effect	To Transjordan and the Triangle
16.5	Yubla	F	Kawkab action effect	To Transjordan
16.5	Murassas	F	" " "	"
16.5	Danna	F	" " "	"
16.5	Bira	F	" " "	"
16.5	Arab al-Bashatiwa	F	" " "	"
16.5	Arab a-Sakhina	F	Because of attack on Tira Zvi. Afraid to remain in proximity to Jews. Harassment action – catalyst.	Went up the Gilboa.
18.5	Jabbul	F	Effect of our action in Kawkab	To Transjordan?
20.5	Sulam	F	Members of the Zu'biya. protégé Arabs.	To Nazareth.
20.5	Dahi	F	Evacuated upon receiving threatening letters from the gangs, and with the arrival of foreigners to the area – feared their villages would be seized by foreigners	To Nazareth.
20.5	Nein) F		"
20.5	Tamra) F		"
	Kafr Misr) F		"
)		"
20.5	Tira Harb) F		"
20.5	Taiyiba) F		"
20.5	Na'ura) F		"

20.5	Khuneizir	F	Beit Shean and Gesher front	To the Gilboa
20.5	Arab Safa	F	" "	To Transjordan (originally from Transjordan)
20.5	Arab 'Arida	F	" "	" "
20.5	Arab az-Zinati	F	" "	" "
24.5	Indur	F	" "	To the Nazareth area
27.5	Samiriyya	F	Our action in the village	To the Triangle
28.5	Danna	F	Our notice to clear out	
28.5	Zir'in	F	Occupation	
30.5	Mazar	F	"	
31.5	Sandala	F	Occupation of Mazar influenced	

[page 6 of Annex No. 1]

d. Yizreel District

<u>Population during normal times</u>			
Nazareth	14,200	Ghubayya Fawqa)
Zippori	4,330	Ghubayya Tahta)
Kafr Manda	1,260	Naghnaghiyya) 1,260
Rummanah	880	Abu Shusha	720
Kafr Kanna	1,960	Qira	140
Reina	1,200	Umm a-Zinat	1,450
Mashhad	660	a-Rihaniyya	340
'Illut	1,310	Daliyat a-Rawha	310
Ma'lul	690	Buteimat	110
Yafia	1,400	Khubbeiza	290
Iksal	1,000	Umm al-Shawf	530
Dabburiya	1,290	Umm al-Fahm	4,000
Ein Mahil	1,040	Arab a-Zubeidat	
Sejera (Sea of Galilee district)		Arab al-Khalf	
Lid al-'Awadin	710	Arab a-Sa'ida	
Ein al-Mansi	100	Arab al-Qa'biya	
Lajjun	600	Arab al-Hujayrat	200
Jenin	3850	Arab al-Jawamys	150
Zabuba	560	Arab al-Mazarib	100
Arab Susafi	150	Arab al-Ghazalin	
Arab Hudeidin		Arab Zbeih	1,500
Kufrein	920	Arab Sa'yda	
Waldheim	260	Beit Lahem	8,800
Mujaidal	1,600		

Degree of Evacuation

Date	Village	Full/Partial	Evacuation cause	Evacuation trajectory, comments
	Shajara	F	Our attack	Nazareth, Tur'an, Ein Mahil
	Lid al-'Awadin	F	Mishmar HaEmek effect	To the Triangle. Tried to return and expelled.
	Ein al-Mansi	F	Our attack	To the Triangle
	Lajjun	F	" "	"
	Jenin	F	" "	". Serious focus of invasion
	Rummanah	F	Fear of attack	To the Triangle

	Zabuba	F	“ “	“
	Ghubayya Fawqa	F	Our attack	“
	Ghubayya Tahta	F	“ “	“
	Abu Shusha	F	“ “	“
	Qira	F	Fear, and effect of attacks in the area.	To Transjordan
	Umm a-Zinat	F	Our attack	To the Karmel and Umm al-Fahm
	Rihaniyya	F	Fear	“ “ “
	Daliyat a-Rawha	F	Fear	To the Triangle
	Buteimat	F	“	To Umm al-Fahm
	Khubbeiza	F	“	“
16.4	Arab a-Zubeidat	F	Ramat Yohanan incidents	Tzipori lands
	Arab al-Khalf	F	“ “	“ “
	Arab Sa’yda	F	“ “	“ “
	Arab al-Mazarib	P	Concerns	
	Arab Zbeih	P	Our attack	Tur’an, Nazareth, Karmel
	Arab a-Sa’ida	F	Mishmar HaEmek incidents	To the Karmel
	Arab al-Hujayrat	F	Mishmar HaEmek, Ramat Yohanan incidents	To Tzipori
	Arab Susafi	F		To Abu Shusha and Mansi
9.2	Arab Hudeidin	F		“ “ “
	Naghnaghiyya	F		
	Kufrein	F		

[page 7 of Annex No. 1]

e. Haifa and Western Galilee District

<u>District population during normal times</u>			
Shfaram	3950	Manshiyya	1140
Balad a-Sheikh	4500	Sumeiriyya	820
Haifa	71200	A-Zib	2050
Al-Mazra’a	460	al-Bassa	3140
Ard al-Saris		Umm al-Faraj	860
Yajur	610	Nahr	3070
Ghabisiyya	740	Amqa	1930
Fureidis	870	Kuweikat	1130
Acre	15000	Damun	340
Ein Ghazal	2410	Sheikh Daud	590
Ijzim	2970	Kafr Lam	380
Iqrit	520	Ein Hawd	380
Quseir	320	Jaba’	1270
I’llillin	1800		
Kabri	1640		
Umm a-Zinat	1470		

Degree of Evacuation

<u>Date</u>	<u>Village</u>	<u>Full/Partial</u>	<u>Evacuation cause</u>	<u>Evacuation trajectory, comments</u>
7.1	Balad a-Sheikh	P	Refinery incident	To the Triangle and Acre
7.1	Hawasa	P	“ “	“ “

3.2	Haifa	P	Fear of what is to come	Syria and Lebanon, mostly the wealthy evacuated
6.2	Mazra'a	F	Surrounded by Jews	A few stayed under protection of General McMillan
12.2	Ard al-Saris	F	Appearance of foreign force	To Shfaram
18.2	Yajur	P		
18.2.	Haifa	P	Fear for the children	To Lebanon. [Archbishop George] Hakim's operation
15.3	Arab al-Ghuneima	P	Haifa effect	To Damun and vicinity
4.4	Hawasa	Many		
4.4	Ghabisiyya	P		
18.4	Yagur	Many	Appearance of Muhammad Mahmoud	To the Triangle, Kabri and Acre.
20.4	Shfaram	P	Druz defeat in Ramat Yohanan	To Nazareth
22.4	Tira	P	Appearance of foreigners	
22.4	Haifa	Most	Haifa occupation operation	To Lebanon, Syria, Acre, Triangle and Tantura
24.4	Reidis [Fureidis?]	Many	Order from Arab Army to evacuate women and children	
25.4	Acre	The wealthy	Haifa action effect	To the border villages, Lebanon
25.4	A-Sheikh	Everyone	" " "	" " "
25.4	Hawasa	F	" " "	" " "
25.4	Yajur	F	" " "	" " "
25.4	Ein Ghazal	P	" " "	To the Triangle
25.4	Ijzim	P	" " "	"
26.4	Iqrit	P	Rumour about convoy to Yehiam	Northwards to the border
27.4	Quseir	P	Haifa effect	Northwards
1.5	Acre	Many	" "	
2.5	I'billin	All		To Sa'sa' and Sha'ab
3.5	Tira	Many	Appearance of foreigners.	Center of foreigners
5.5	Kabri	All	Fear of reprisals after the attack on Ehud	[illegible], Lebanon, north
6.5	Acre	Many	Harassment, Typhus plague	To Haifa, Transjordan, Syria

[page 8 of Annex No. 1]

f. Central Region and Jaffa District

<u>District population during normal times</u>			
Tantura	1650	Fardisya	20
Fureidis	870	Arab an-Nuseirat	
Sabbarin	1880	Tira	3440
Sindiyana	1390	Qalansuwa	1660
Umm a-Shawf	480	Arab al-Rumeilat	
Bureika	320	(near HaMaapil)	

Arab al-Ghawarina	690	Sayyidna 'Ali	
Qannir	750	Jlil	1020
Kafr Qara	1510	Kafr Saba	1370
Arab Turqman		Biyar 'Adas	300
Arab al-Bara		Sheikh Muwannis	2000
Qisarya	1240		
Wadi 'Ara	260	Arab Abu Kishk	1900
Sarkas		Arab Salama	800
Dumeira	620	Miska	650
Arab al-Fuqara	340	Khirbat 'Azzun	994
Arab a-Nufei'at	910	Mirr	190
'Ara	890	Fajja	1360
Kh. Zalafa	370	Arab al-Jarmala	
Khirbat Manshiya	280	Yahudiyya	6560
Arab Hawarith	1440	Kafr 'Ana	2000
Umm Khalid	1050	Saqiya	1240
Khirbat Beit Lid	500	Khairiyya	1600
Salama	7610	Jammasin	2050

Degree of Evacuation

Date	Village	Full/Partial	Evacuation cause	Evacuation trajectory, comments
21.2	Khirbat 'Azzun	P		To the village of 'Azzun, Sheikh Muwannis, first village evacuated in this area.
25.12	Summeil	Everyone		Jammasin
31.12	Arab al-Balawina	Everyone	Fear	
7.1	Jammasin	Many		
12.1	Qisarya	Beginning		
31.1	Arab Abu Rizik	Everyone		
3.2	Arab an-Nuseirat	Everyone	Our actions	To Taybeh, Qalansuwa The village is empty
3.2	Sayyidna 'Ali	Everyone	Fear of hostile action. Surrounded	Qalqiliyah and vicinity. Village occupied by our forces.
3.2	Kafr Mirr	Everyone	General fear	To Kafr Qasem and the mountains Village is empty.
8.2	Jarmala	P	Gang orders	To Kafr Qasem
9.2	Qisarya	P	Rate of evacuation [greatly increased]	
11.2	Arab a-Shubak	Everyone	Reprisal by Dissidents	To Arab Abu [kishk]
11.2	Khirbat 'Azzun	Everyone	Fear and actions	To village of 'Azzun
15.2	Arab Turqman	Everyone	Fear of hostile action by us	Mansi Wad, Almuha
15.2	Qisarya	Everyone	Occupied by our forces	Tantura, Haifa Village is empty
15.2	Kafr Mirr	-	Some returned	
15.2	Arab al-Rumeilat (near HaMaapil)	F	General fear and Whispering operation by us	To the mountain and to Bureij
15.2	Arab al-Rumeilat (near Netanya)	P	General fear and Whispering operation by us	To the mountain and to Bureij. 150 on May 4.

15.2	Arab al-Rumeilat (near Kadima)	F	General fear and Whispering operation by us	To the mountain and to Bureij
15.2	Arab Haweitat	F	General fear	To the mountains between Taybeh and Irtah.
17.2	Dhaqaba	Everyone	Appearance of foreigners at the locale.	
17.2	Fajja	P	After the Irgun action.	
25.2	Arab Hijazi	Everyone		
27.2	Wadi 'Ara	Everyone	After the attack on Ma'anit	'Ar'ara, Ya'bed. Occupied by our forces
6.3	Bureika	Everyone		
15.3	Arab Mahadw	Everyone	Fear of reprisal after Arab mine was laid in vicinity	To Tulkarm. Village is empty.
15.3	Arab Hawarith	Everyone	After we sabotaged Arab transportation near the village	Qaqun, Baqa al-Gharbiyye. The village is empty.
17.3	Jammasin	Most	General fear	To Ghasam
20.3	Umm Khalid	Everyone	Located inside Jewish community. Afraid of it and of hostile actions	Tulkarm. Occupied by our forces.
20.3	Khirbat Beit Lid	Beginning	After we sabotaged Arab transportation.	To Beit Lid. Village is empty
23.3	Arab al-Koz	Everyone		To Lod
30.3	Arab Abu Kishk	Everyone	After splitter's action in Sheikh Muwannis	Kharish
30.3	Sheikh Muwannis	Everyone	After the abduction by the Dissidents	Qalqiliyah, abroad. Fled with Arab Abu Kishk.
30.3	Arab Salama	Everyone	Effect of Dissidents in Sheikh Muwannis	Kharish
30.3	Arab a-Nufei'at	Everyone		To Sarkas
1.4	Jaramalla	Everyone	General fear	Majdal Kafr Qasem. Some come and work during the day.
3.4	Arab Imrir	Everyone	After robbery and murder committed by Dissidents	To the area of Qalqiliyah and JalJulia. The place is empty.
3.4	Arab al-Hawk	Everyone	After robbery and murder committed by Dissidents	Taybeh, Tira. Some returned to their tribe in Negev.
3.4	Arab al-Fallaq	Everyone	Cattle robbery by Irgun, and transportation problems	Tira and Triangle. The village is empty.
3.4	Jlil	Everyone	Effect of Dissidents and their action in Sheikh Muwannis	Qalqiliyah and Tira. Occupied by our forces.

3.4	Khirbat 'Azzun	End	End of evacuation at the demand of the Haganah	To the village of 'Azzun. Occupied by our forces.
5.4	Qannir	P	Beginning of evacuation. Fear of our actions	Jenin area.
5.4	Khirbat Beit Lid	Everyone	Fear.	To Beit Lid
10.4	Arab al-Fuqara	Everyone	Transportation Received order to evacuate from Haganah	Baqa al-Gharbiyye, Jit. Village is empty.
10.4	Arab a-Nufei'at	Everyone	Received order to evacuate from Haganah	Baqa al-Gharbiyye, Jit. Village is empty.
10.4	Bamariya	Everyone	Received order to evacuate from Haganah	Baqa al-Gharbiyye, Jit. Village is empty.
12.4	Biyar 'Adas	Everyone	Our actions in the area	Jaljuliya and vicinity. Occupied by our forces
15.4	Sarkas	Everyone	Received order to leave from Haganah	Wadi al-Moya, Baqa al-Gharbiyye, Jit. Village is empty.
15.4	Khirbat Zalafa	Everyone	Effect of vicinity	'Atil, Zeita. According to advance agreement between us and them.
			[page 10 of Annex No. 1]	
15.4	Khirbat Manshiya	Everyone	Effect of vicinity	According to advance agreement between us and them.
15.4	Miska	Everyone	On orders of the Haganah	Tira, Qalqiliyah. Occupied by our forces.
15.4	Abu Zureiq	Everyone		
17.4	Arab al-Bara	Everyone	Fear of hostile actions by us	To Sarkas, Tantura. Ein Ghaz, Ijzim. The village is empty.
17.4	Kafr 'Ana	P		Ramla, Lod.
20.4	Sawalima	Everyone		
25.4	Saqiya	Everyone	Occupied by our forces	Ramla, Lod and the vicinity.
25.4	Khairiyya	Everyone	Occupied by our forces	Ramla, Lod and the vicinity.
25.4	Salama	Everyone	Occupied by our forces	Ramla, Lod and the vicinity.
25.4	Kafr 'Ana	Everyone	Occupied by our forces	Ramla, Lod and the vicinity.
25.4	Qannir	End	Effect of the area – stoked fear	Jenin area. The village is destroyed
25.4	Beit Dajan	Everyone	After occupation of Khairiyya	Harassment by Jews. Yahudiyya. Lod, Ramla
26.4	Bureika	Everyone	Fear	To Sindiyyana
26.4	Sarkas	Everyone	Fear of actions	To Lod
28.4	Rantiya	Everyone	After our attack	Laban, Shuqba, al-Manar, Yahudiyya,
1.5	Yazur	Everyone	Harassment by Jews	Lod, Jammassin and Sheikh Muwannis
2.5	Sindiyyana	P.	Jaffa effect Fear of Arab revenge as they lent to Jews	

4.5	Yahudiyya	Everyone	Occupied by the Irgun	Ramla, Lod and vicinity. Occupied by Irgun
4.5	Tira (Qaqun)	P.		Men still there.
5.5	Bureika	Everyone	Effect of attack on Qannir	'Inin, Rummanah. Some present – surrendered.
6.5	Tantura	P.	Evacuation of women and children	
8.5	Kafr Qara	Everyone	Our attack on them.	'Ar'arah, Barta'ah, Ya'bad. The village is empty.
8.5	'Ana	Everyone	Effect of our attack on Kafr Qara	'Ar'arah, Ein Salha. The village is empty.
10.5	Arab al-Jarmala	End	General fear.	Majdal, Kafr Qasem, come to work during the day.
14.5	Sabbarin	Everyone	Occupied by the Irgun	'Ar'ara, Ya'bed. Occupied by the Irgun.
14.5	Sindiyyana	Everyone	Occupied by the Irgun	'Ar'ara, Ya'bed. Occupied by the Irgun.
14.5	Umm a-Shawf	Everyone	Occupied by the Irgun	Rummanah, Umm al-Fahm. Occupied by the Irgun.
14.5	Qalqiliyah	P.	Women and children.	Was receiving point, turned into flight point
15.5	Arab Jalad	Everyone	Effect of [declaration] of Jewish state	Tulkarm, Danaba. The village is empty.
15.5	Kafr Saba	Everyone	Occupied by our forces	Qalqiliyah area. Occupied by our forces.
15.5	Fajja	Everyone (end)	Our pressure – Whispering operation	To the mountains – the remaining few left.
19.5	Qalqiliyah	Everyone	After harassment actions by us.	
20.5	Hablah	Everyone	Harassment actions by us.	
21.5	Tantura	Everyone	Occupied by our forces.	Everyone held captive in their locale. Our forces are in the village.

[page 11 of Annex No. 1]

g. The south and the Negev

<u>Population during normal times</u>			
Bureir	400	al-Mansura	100
Huleiqat) 1500	'Arab Suqreir	430
Kawkaba		Yasur	1070
Najd	600	Sawafir Gharbiyya	1030
Sumsum	1200	Sawafir Shamaliyya	680
Jammama	150	Julis	1130
Muharraqa) 1100	Batani a-Sharqi	710
Kawfakha		Barqa	980
Huj	800	Beit Daras	3010
Beit Tima	1060	Arab as-Satariyya	
Sarafand al-Kharab	1130	(Abu Khatab)	
Wadi Hunein	1770	Na'ani	2270
Shafun		Abu Shusha	950
Arab Satariyya (Abu Suweira)		Saidun	230
Arab Rubin	1550	Khulda	300
Qubeiba	1870	Dayr Muheisin	360
Zarnuga	2600	Beit Jiz	600
		al-Qabab	2160

Yibna	5920	Shahma	310
Bir Salim	950	Bureir	4000
'Aqir	2710		
Mughar	1900		
Bashshit	1770		
Qatra	1320		

Degree of Evacuation

Date	Village	Full/Partial	Evacuation cause	Evacuation trajectory, comments
12.5	Bureir	F.	Our actions	Mostly to Majdal and others: Beit Lahiya, Nazla Hirbiya
12.5	Huleiqat	F.	Bureir evacuation effect	Nazla Hirbiya, Beit Lahiya, Majdal.
12.5	Kawkaba	F.	Bureir evacuation effect	Nazla Hirbiya, Beit Lahiya, Majdal.
12.5	Najd	F.	Our ultimatum	Nazla Hirbiya, Beit Lahiya, Majdal. Over time, some returned.
12.5	Sumsum	F.	Our ultimatum	Nazla Hirbiya, Beit Lahiya, Majdal. Over time, some returned.
22.5	Jammama	F.	Our action.	Remained in their area, being semi Bedouin
25.2	Muharraqa	F.	Our action.	Remained in their area, being semi Bedouin
25.5	Kawfakha	F.	Our action.	Remained in their area, being semi Bedouin
28.5	Huj	F.	Ultimatum	To Dimra
29.5	Beit Tima	F.	Our action.	

[page 12 of Annex No. 1]

Date	Village	Full/Partial	Evacuation cause	Evacuation trajectory,	comments
20.4.48	Sarafand al-Kharab	F.	Fear. Surrounded.	Ramla, Lod	Handover of Rishon LeTzion police to us.
17.4.48	Wadi Hunein	"	Bombing of Hassan Salameh headquarters.	" "	
9.5.48	Shafun	"	Occupation of Beer Yaakov camp	" "	
9.5.48	Arab Abu al-Fadl	"	" "	Qubeiba, Yibna	
9.5.48	Arab Satariyya (Humeida)	"	" "	Beersheba	
1.6.58 [sic]	Arab Rubin	"	Expelled as a result of our action	Coastline sands, south of Yibna	
27.5.48	Qubeiba	"	Our action, expulsion	Yibna sands, Ashdod	
27.5.48	Zarnuga	"	Occupation and expulsion	Yibna and Ashdod	
4.6.48	Yibna	"	" "	To southern communities, all the way to Gaza	All residents of Yibna, Zarnuga, Qub. Went south all the way to Gaza when these locales were occupied

9.5.48	Bir Salim	“	Attack on orphanage	Ramla – Lod	
6.5.48	'Aqir	F.	Our action, occupied.	Mughar, Bashshit, Yibna, Ramla	Some remained in the village (women, elderly and children).
18.5.48	Mughar	F.	Occupation.	Yibna, Ashdod, Gaza, Khan Yunis	
13.5.48	Bashshit	“	“	Mughar, Yibna, Gaza and vicinity	
17.5.48	Qatra	“	“	Masmiyya	Was protégé village until Egyptians arrived near Ashdod.
20.4.48	al-Mansura	“	“	Village completely destroyed	
25.1.48	'Arab Suqreir (Abu Suweira)	“	“	South to the sands and to Gaza	
11.6.48	Yasur	“	“		
18.5.48	Sawafir Gharbiyya	“	Fled as the front approached Hamama		
18.5.48	Sawafir Shamaliyya	“	“ “		
11.6.48	Julis	“	Occupation		
[page 13 of Annex No. 1]					
13.5.48	Batani a-Sharqi	F.	Occupation	Ashdod, Hamama	
13.5.48	Barqa	“	“	Hamama, Ashdod	
11.5.48	Beit Daras	“	“	“ “	
	Arab Satariyya	“	Fled because of military actions nearby	Yibna Sands	
	Abu Khatab				
14.5.48	Na'ani	“		Some to Ramla, some to Qazaza. Was protégé village after it surrendered. Abandoned on 10.6	
20.5.48	Abu Shusha	“	Occupation		
20.1.48	Saidun	“	Village abandoned		
20.4.48	Khulda	“	Occupation		
20.4.48	Dayr Muheisin	“	“		
20.4.48	Beit Jiz	“	“		
	Beit Susin	“	“		
	al-Qabab	“	“		

14.5 Shahma “ Actions in the area Village abandoned

[page 14 of Annex No. 1]

h. Jerusalem area

Population during normal times

Lifta	2730	Qastal	100
Qalandia	200	Saris	600
Beit Safafa	1510	Bidu	560
al-'Eizariyah	1130	Nabi Samwil	210
Abu Dis	2070	a-Tur	2960
Beit Sahur	2590	Beit Hanina	1700
Bethlehem	9140	Judayra	200
Beit Jala	3740	Bayt Nabala	630
Jericho	3210	al-Jib	890
'Esawiyah	780	Rafat	300
Dayr Yasin	650	Shu'fat	810
'Ein Karim	3390	Dayr Muheisin	500
Qalunya	970	Beit Jiz	600
Beit Ikka	880	Beit Surik	510
Malliha	2070	Dayr Ayyub	350
Ramallah	5180		

Degree of Evacuation

Date	Village	Full/ Partial	Evacuation cause	Evacuation trajectory, comments
31.12	Lifta	P.		To Malliha
1.1	Arab Romema	Everyone		
1.1	Upper Lifta	Everyone		To Malliha
2.1	Jerusalem - Katamon	Many		To Egypt, Lebanon
4.1	Qalandia	Everyone		
5.1	Jerusalem - Katamon	Many		To Egypt, Lebanon
8.1	Jerusalem - Sheikh Jarrah	Very many		
9.1	Jerusalem - Schneller	Everyone		Beit Nabala, Ramallah
11.1	Jerusalem - Musrara	Very many		
18.1	Beit Safafa	P.		
18.1	Jerusalem – Sheikh Badr			
27.1	'Eizariyah	Many		Mostly toward Hebron.
27.1	Abu Dis	Many		“ “ “
27.1	Beit Sahur	Many		“ “ “
27.1	Beit Safafa	Many		“ “ “
1.2	Bethlehem	Small part		To Jericho and Transjordan
1.2	Beit Jala	“ “		“ “ “
4.2	Jerusalem – near Talpiyot	Everyone		
12.2	Jerusalem - Talbiye	Everyone	Our propaganda	
16.2	Beit Safafa	Everyone		Foreigners on site
16.2	Jericho	A few		To Transjordan
27.2	'Esawiyah	Everyone	Close to Jews	To immediate vicinity
8.3	Jerusalem	The wealthy,		Mostly to Lebanon

8.3	Qalandia	women, children Everyone		
22.3	'Esawiyah	Returned	after running to the near vicinity	
30.3	'Esawiyah	Everyone	Received order to evacuate from Arab Higher Committee	
1.4	Jerusalem - Musrara	Everyone		
9.4	Dayr Yasin	Everyone	Dissidents' action	Most were killed
10.4	'Ein Karim	Everyone		Malliha, Beit Jala, Ramallah
10.4	Qalunya	Women and children		
15.4	Beit Ikksa	Everyone		
[page 14 of Annex No. 1]				
18.4	Dayr Abu Tor	Everyone	Dayr Yasin effect	
21.4	Malliha	p.	“ “ and appearance of foreigners	
21.4	'Ein Karim	P.	Women and children, and appearance of foreigners.	
28.4	Ramallah	Small part	To Bethlehem	
28.4	Jerusalem	Small part	To Bethlehem	
3.5	Qastal	Everyone	Our occupation, the opening of the road	
3.5	Qalunya	Everyone	“ “	
3.5	Saris	Everyone	“ “	
3.5	Bidu	Everyone	“ “	
3.5	Beit Ikksa	Everyone	“ “	
3.5	Nabi Samwil	Everyone	“ “	
3.5	Abu Dis	P.		Only women and children
3.5	Abu Tor	P.		“ “ “ “
3.5	'Eizariyah	P.	Appearance of many foreigners	
6.5	Malliha	p.		To Bethlehem
6.5	Jerusalem – South	Everyone		To Christian institutions in the Old City and Bethlehem
9.5	Jerusalem – Old City	Many		Muslims go to the villages
11.5	Jerusalem – Old City	Many		Hebronites return to their city
11.5	Beit Ikksa	Everyone	Our action	
13.5	Judayra	Everyone	Orders from the legion to evacuate, needed as base	
13.5	Bayt Hanina	Everyone	“ “ “ “ “ “ “ “	
13.5	Bayt Nabala	Everyone	“ “ “ “ “ “ “ “	
13.5	al-Jib	Everyone	“ “ “ “ “ “ “ “	
13.5	Rafat	Everyone	“ “ “ “ “ “ “ “	
13.5	Shu'fat	Everyone	“ “ “ “ “ “ “ “	
15.5	Jerusalem – Christians	Everyone		To Bethlehem

21.5	Jerusalem – Old City	Many	
29.5	Dayr Muheisin	Everyone	Our action
29.5	Beit Jiz	Everyone	“ “
?	Beit Surik	“	“ “
? ?	Dayr Ayyub	“	“ “
29.5	Jerusalem, outside the wall	Everyone	Occupied by us
30.5	Jerusalem – Old City	Many	With the fierce battles

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