Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee meetings, June 1967 – June 1968: the complete transcripts. Part 1

This meeting took place in the late stages of the first phase of the war, when the Israeli military was already inside the Old City of Jerusalem, advancing in the West Bank and deep in the Sinai Desert and stationed on the international border in front of the Golan Heights. Several participants pushed for conquest in the Golan Heights, while the prime minister and the minister of defense objected to such a move. The minister of defense did, however, note that the military was capable of the mission. Members of the committee discussed President Johnson’s motivations for supporting Israel’s military achievements, including his need for the Jewish vote. They also discussed Israeli control over a million more Arabs (Palestinians) in the newly occupied territories: “Had we had three, four million Jews in the country right now, with proper natural growth […] we would have been in a different place”, the prime minister said in the meeting.

Guests:
Levy Eshkol – Prime Minister
Moshe Dayan – Defense Minister
Yisrael Galili – Minister of Information
Minsters Menachem Begin and Yosef Sapir

The meeting was held several days after fighting ended. Its main focus was a briefing from the minister of defense on the main phases and manoeuvers of the war, including the conquest of the Golan Heights and the West Bank as a result of opportunities that came up during the fighting. Defense Minister Dayan described his considerations regarding the main manoeuvers and analyzed what he believed were Israel’s main errors before and during the war. Another topic discussed at the meeting was minor Soviet involvement in the fighting, and the event that saw the defense minister issuing the order to take the Golan Heights, despite the absence of the chief of staff and his deputy at the time.

Guests:
Moshe Dayan – Defense Minister
Yitzhak Rabin – IDF Chief of Staff

Agenda:
Confirming orders
Defense Minister Moshe Dayan briefing

After a brief discussion on composition of Parliamentary delegation to UN General Assembly the meeting was postponed to 3:00 P.M. and committee members went on a tour of Bethlehem, Hebron and Gush Etzion.

Agenda:

Parliamentary delegation to UN General Assembly.

The focus of this meeting was a briefing from Foreign Affairs Minister Abba Eban regarding the diplomatic battleground, where efforts were made to prolong the last phase of the war to complete the conquest of the Golan Heights. Diplomatic activity was still underway at the time of the meeting. Eban described the efforts, steered by the prime minister, to have Israel withdraw from the territories it occupied, as contrasted with Israeli-American coordination that disfavoured reinstating pre-war conditions, and aimed at establishing the lines on which the war ended as the point of departure for any change in the region. Eban rejected the option of remaining in a liminal situation stating a decision must be made – war or peace. He said that Israel had turned from an “underdog” into an “overdog”, and that it was more difficult to advocate from a winning position than from the position of the victim. Eban also said that Israel must take a position on the future of its conquests and the future of foreign affairs in order to effectively promote its diplomatic agenda.

Agenda:
Foreign Affairs Minister briefing.

Guests:
Abba Eban – Foreign Affairs Minister
Gidon Refael – Israel UN Ambassador
Moshe Raviv – Foreign Affairs Minister’s Political Secretary

This meeting was devoted to the prime minister’s briefing on UN developments regarding the future of the region. Prime Minister Eshkol spoke in detail about the position of the US (full, silent, support for Israel) and gave a brief overview of Israeli diplomatic activity vis-à-vis a variety of other countries. The prime minister also spoke at length on the issue of legislation for the annexation of Jerusalem, given the situation on the diplomatic scene and the sensitivity of the issue. The ministers discussed whether and when to promote such legislation and agreed that the matter should not be discussed in public. MK Y. Hazan brought up the issue of Palestinian refugees whom, he believed, Israel was encouraging to leave, and urged to find an Israeli-initiated solution for them. MK. G. Cohen and MK. Y.S. Ben-Meir seconded his position on the refugees. The prime minister took a position against hasty declarations regarding any rehabilitation of refugees, and questions regarding the human rights of the occupied population remained practically unanswered.
Agenda:
Appointing stand-ins for committee members
Appointing observers for committee meetings
Prime minister briefing
Guests:
Kadish Luz – Knesset Speaker
Levy Eshkol – Prime Minister
Arie Levavy – Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Director-General
Moshe Roseti – Knesset Secretary
Aviad Yaffe – Prime Minister’s Political Secretary

The focus of this session – GOC Central Command Uzi Narkis’ briefing on the situation in the West Bank, and Defense Minister Moshe Dayan’s address regarding administrative and financial aspects of rule over the West Bank.
Narkis described the work of the military and government ministries in the West Bank, in light of the directive “to bring life in the West Bank to normalcy as soon as possible”, saying the military operated in the West Bank “according to the international convention”, that is the Fourth Geneva Convention. He gave a detailed description of the civil administration mechanism that was being put together, and the division of labor and responsibilities between government and military bodies, including in reference to major religious sites in the West Bank and the Old City of Jerusalem.
Narkis and Dayan reported calm in the West Bank, but Dayan mentioned this did not necessarily indicate future calm: “[…] This may be an initial shock”, he said, adding, “The calm of Nablus and Hebron is not the calm of Wadi Ara”. Dayan believed that the “cardinal issue” in the West Bank was the economy: “We completely undermined the economic structure of the West Bank… All the sources of livelihood that were available in the West Bank – no longer exist. If the State of Israel fails to build an alternative economic structure in the West Bank soon, there is a risk of complete collapse there”.

This session centered around a briefing by Head of Military Intelligence Maj. Gen. Aharon Yariv regarding soviet involvement in arming Arab countries and in military-political relationships in the Middle East. Yariv estimated that even if the USSR put extremely heavy pressure on Israel, it is doubtful that it would cause an actual war. He noted the international strategic importance of the conflict in this region for the USA.

Speaking about resistance movements, Yariv said: “The only terrorist organization known to continue intense operations at this time is Fatah”. Yariv said the military had given handling Fatah over to the General Security Service. Defense Minister Dayan spoke of displacement of residents and older refugees on a large scale as a result of the war. He repeated his argument that the economic factor was the main issue driving departure to Jordan: harm to tourism and income from Kuwait, the obliteration of export possibilities, high Israeli prices for means of production and goods (for instance, fuel) – with “extreme disproportion” to the means available to OPT residents.

Dayan outlined the three main issues around which he believed the anticipated heavy international pressure would revolve: the refugees’ return, the status of the West Bank and the question of Jerusalem.

This session focused on the discussions held at the UN General Assembly, where the USA and Israel thwarted a Russian-Yugoslav proposition for Israeli withdrawal from the territories it occupied during the war. Several members of the extended parliamentary delegation who returned from these discussions attended the session and reported.

Session participants unanimously agreed that overall, the position Israel had taken at the assembly had had a great victory. The achievement was attributed to American support and unprecedented coordination between the US and Israel, as well as to the work of Foreign Minister Abba Eban and the rest of the Israeli delegation, who received much praise during the session. The relationship between Israel and the US, and its future, were discussed at length.

The three main questions addressed by the participants were the issue of holding on to the territories (with positions ranging from advancing official annexation to keeping the territories under military control as a long-term trust); addressing the refugee problem and Jerusalem – where discussion centered around annexing the city to Israel through legislation during the UN General Assembly.

This session took place immediately after a series of altercations, involving fire, between Israel and Egypt in Sinai over operations and disputes concerning the status quo in the Suez Canal. The minister of defense, the chief of staff, and intelligence department officer, Brig. Gen. Yigal Karmon described how events in the Sinai unfolded and provided information about the positions of the Egyptians and the Russians, reported work vis-à-vis the ICRC and the UN observer force, mentioned the fate of oil in Sinai and provided their estimates regarding the future.

Agenda:
Incidents in Sinai
Guests:
Moshe Dayan – Minister of Defense
Yizhak Rabin – IDF Chief of General Staff
Col. D. Carmon

This session addressed two main topics: First, the conditions experienced by Jews living in various Arab countries due to assaults stemming from the war and the tension in the Middle East. The positions of various countries on Israel’s demand to allow Jews who wish to leave to do so were reviewed.

During the second part of the session, Yosef Tekoa, a member of the Israeli delegation to the UN gave a briefing about the situation at the UN’s emergency assembly which addressed post-war conditions. Tekoa spoke about the Israeli-American effort to stave off concluding proposition that undermined Israel’s position, which rejected any withdrawal without a peace treaty.

On the issue of Jerusalem, Tekoa emphasized that Israel must refrain from any comments on the subject, and play down its position on the international arena, saying: “At this tactical stage, we must make a distinction between our policy and our clear, unequivocal and unshakeable position with respect to Jerusalem and our communications with various world institutions on this issue”.

Agenda:
– Riots against Jews in Arab countries
– Mr. Tekoa’s brief of developments at UN emergency session

This session focused on a briefing on the situation in Gaza from its military governor, Col. Aviv Barzilai, and comments from the minister of defense and others on this issue.

The lion’s share of this session was devoted to the administrative arrangements for civilian governance in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, with a focus on the division of labor and responsibilities between the government and the military. Current information and assessments were provided with respect to the situation and to operations in the sphere of civilian life in the Gaza Strip, and security conditions there.

Barzilai also reviewed the operations of various aid agencies in the Gaza Strip, which were presented as integral to Israel’s security and PR interest in improving the dire humanitarian conditions in the Strip. Barzilai also related that intelligence operations in the Strip were advancing rapidly, that the political leadership was already under surveillance, which was expected to increase, and that a network that would warn in case of any significant organization efforts against military rule has already been put in place in Gaza.

Agenda:
Col. Barzilai’s review of the situation in Gaza Strip

This session was devoted to briefings from Israel’s ambassadors to the USA, the UN, the UK, France and Belgium with respect to the diplomatic situation since the war. The ambassadors described the “diplomatic battles” during and after the war, and provided their situation evaluations for the time. Each ambassador analyzed the policy of the country where he was serving, with reference to public opinion in the various countries and the local Jewish community’s reaction to the war.

In view of heavy pressure on Israel in the international arena, which, according to an assessment shared by all session participants, developed incrementally, the need to provide some hope for peace in the Middle East, while deflecting any demand for withdrawals without a peace treaty, was discussed. Along with recommendations to initiate significate measures toward settling refugees in the territories, the diplomatic option discussed in the session was a show of willingness to negotiate with King Hussein.

This option was described during the session as partly a measure to prevent Soviet-American coordination regarding the region and to “maintain disunity in the Arab camp”. On this issue, Ambassador to UN Gideon Refael explained: “I am not talking about the substance and conditions of negotiations, but rather about a pretence, even with respect to willingness, although I do not deny that if there is willingness it might even be possible to achieve something”.

   Two major issues were discussed during this session. First, the demand made by MK Meir Yaari and others to have a discussion to “review the Six Day War”. The meeting should address lessons learned from the war and a discussion of the future – Israel’s peace plans on the one hand, and “whether we’re chasing Greater Israel” on the other. This demand became a bone of contention during the session, after Dayan and others said that so long as Israel had to endure heavy international pressure, it was neither the time nor the place to have discussions that might invoke criticism of the situation, and of Israel’s conduct, internally as well.
In the second part of the session, GSS senior official, Avraham Ahituv gave a briefing on the situation in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. He focused particularly on profiling the leadership in the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip.
In the last part of the session, the defense minister addressed calls to use more forceful measures in the OPT. Dayan wondered why this was necessary, given that until then “not a single Jewish soldier, not a single Jewish civilian had been killed” in the OPT, all this while Israelis were visiting and shopping there, “They even enter the Tomb of the Patriarchs with shoes on, and it’s a mosque, and now there’s an Ark in there…”, “You put the Torah in a mosque and say that everything is okay”, Dayan said, “I just pray it lasts”.
 Pages 14-19 are missing from the document digitized at the Israel State Archives.

This session focused on tactical and strategic, military and political lessons from the war. It was held a week after the session in which Yaari and other members demanded the committee discuss the lessons of the war with the prime minister, the defense minister and the foreign minister – a demand Defense Minister Dayan and others were tepid toward.

The session was headed by a long, detailed briefing from Head of Intelligence Maj. Gen. Aharon Yariv, which addressed the political background for the war, the situation in the Arab world, intelligence and Israel’s situation evaluations and war manoeuvres. Chief of Staff Rabin and the minister of defense also spoke at length.

One of the main conclusions Yariv spoke of during the session was that Egypt had had no intention of striking at Israel before the war broke out. Dayan, who pre-emptively opposed a discussion where such a conjecture might come up (see Transcript no. 78), disagreed with the head of intelligence on this point.

This session was devoted to Foreign Minister Abba Eban’s briefing on developments in the diplomatic arena: the Kahroum Summit and its resolutions, the Yugoslav move for Israeli withdrawal and its outcomes, and preparations for the resumption of Assembly discussions in the middle of the month.

The foreign affairs minister explained that Israel and the US ultimately agreed that the way to address the coming pressure was to wait, and at the same time, obstruct any initiatives for diplomatic progress: “For the time being… what is required is patience, holding the lines and blocking negative initiatives, and, if sending a delegate cannot be avoided […] then without the powers to impose solutions and rules”. Several tricks could be employed in order to do so, such as, resurrecting the idea that “a group of countries propose the UN ask the sides to resolve the conflict through direct negotiations […] I do not delude myself that such a proposition would, in fact, be accepted”, Eban said, “but it may serve as one of the blocks” for progress.

This session complemented Session No. 81. Foreign Minister Abba Eban completed his briefing, followed by questions and a discussion in preparation for continued diplomatic efforts and UN General Assembly discussions. The session focused on Israel’s potential responses to international pressure – how to maintain the fundamental position of no retreat without a peace agreement.

Much of the session focused on the issues of the refugees and borders, and touched on rule and sovereignty over Temple Mount. Given anticipated pressure to retreat, various participants in the meeting offered different ways to stall discussions on the future of the OPT: Emphasizing the “three no’s” of the Khartoum Summit, and ignoring its resolution that the issues must be resolved diplomatically (p. 5), subjecting any progress to complete cessation of belligerence and armament on the Arab side (pp. 6-7), or encouraging independent political organization inside Palestine to distinguish it from Arab countries, and removing their capacity to speak for the Palestinians (p. 10).

Some of the speakers in the session, including the foreign minister, addressed the legal issue of countering the international principle that occupation grants no rights in the land. Eban suggested presenting the 1967 case as an exception to the rule.

This session focused mostly on lessons learned from the war. The committee discussed the military assessments, actions and policies that guided Israel’s approach to Arab countries, specifically Egypt and to the international community, specifically the USA, in the days that preceded the war. Some participants voiced support for establishing Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, both as a matter of “security” and as a matter of “national interest”.

Throughout the discussion, participants made repeated references to the positions voiced during committee sessions held on May 26, and May 27, prior to the war, and to the atmosphere in these sessions, which, as per the decision of the committee, were not recorded because of Shabbat. The various statements made during this session indicate that during the pre-war sessions, serious doubt was expressed as to Israel’s ability to win the anticipated war, and that a “bitter, cruel dispute” (MK Yizhar Harari, p. 20) erupted over what action should be taken and the need to make a decision promptly.

The session recorded in this transcript focused on Palestinian disobedience and insurgency against Israel’s military rule and Israel’s policy in the territories in response. The session opened with the head of military intelligence giving his assessment that upon Israel’s assumption of control over a large territory with an Arab population, Palestinian organizations were interested in turning their fight into “a widespread guerilla war […] by a popular resistance movement”, likened to the Northern Vietnamese fight against the USA.

From that point, the discussion veered toward the proper way to manage control over the Palestinians: Was it right, or even possible, to distinguish between the Palestinian disobedience movement and armed attacks against Israel? On the practical plane: Should a strict approach be taken toward the Palestinian civilian population or only against armed resistance? How can Israel send the message that good deeds will be rewarded and bad ones will be punished – should collective punishment be used against the population by city, or within cities as well? During the discussion of punitive measures, Dayan recalled Sheikh Abdul Hamid al-Sayih’s expulsion from Jerusalem. The defense minister said the sheikh had led political resistance and civil disobedience in the city and was expelled “even though we knew such an act contravened the Geneva Convention” (p. 7). Committee members also discussed policies of capital punishment and house demolitions.

This session opened with a report from the minister of defense regarding armed attacks against Israel and efforts to procure arms from the USA and France. The session then turned to continued discussion of the lessons learned from the war, and in particular, placing the blame for the aggression that preceded it on the different parties. Participants paid special attention, throughout the session, to reconstructing the pubic climate, and the general feeling among decision makers in late May 1967.

The discussion focused on the various accounts and interpretations of the sentiments and statements expressed in two committee sessions that took place on May 26 and 27. Recording of these sessions was halted, at the demand of MK Yizhak Refaeli, as the Sabbath began. Was there, in fact, “confusion” among decision makers? And how did it turn into an assault? What role did Moshe Dayan (who became defense minister on June 1), and David Ben-Gurion play in the deliberations and decision to go to war? Between caution and fear, hesitancy and collapse, the different perceptions of the unrecorded committee sessions can be found in the records of this session as well.

The final pages of the transcripts were missing from the copy made available for review in the State Archive.

The first part of the session documented here focused on armed attacks by al-Fatah. The discussion begun in session 84, regarding the proper way for the military government to handle attackers and the civilian population, continued.

During the second part of the session, participants focused on the need to quickly increase Israel’s military capacities, ahead of another possible war, given the limited stocks of weapons and ammunition it had available for the last war. The most far-reaching suggestion on this issue, made by MK Yaakov Hazan, was to enlist Israel’s entire industry to fulfil most of the country’s need for armaments.